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An Enigma Set to Remain A Fizzer? 




The uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand has been pretty dismal.  While a few 
companies produced social and/or environmental reports in the early 1990s, and the 
practice diffused a little during the 2000s, New Zealand remains an outlier with the vast bulk 
of New Zealand’s largest organisations still not producing such reports. Early commentators 
noted that the practice was “desperately seeking volunteers” (Gilkison, 1998) and with 
reporting rates languishing the practice was still considered to be “starting behind” by the 
KPMG international surveys in 2011, 2013 and 2015.   
 
This study aims to gain insights into why reporting has not flourished in New Zealand, 
despite its early start, and despite considerable efforts on the part of not only those few 
organisations that have reported, but also other business intermediaries dedicated to 
promoting sustainable business practices including reporting.  We map the sustainable 
business field and identify influential players. We undertake semi-structured interviews with 
two Chief Executives of New Zealand sustainable business intermediaries (SBIs) and with 
senior managers of eleven of their reporting and non-reporting members. We use neo-
institutional theory (NIT) to frame and analyse our findings.    
 
We find that reporting rationales identified in the literature and promoted by the business 
intermediaries both motivate and cause resistance to reporting. Reporting seems far from 
an inevitable outcome for organisations engaging with sustainability in New Zealand, and 
while the SBIs appear to facilitate weak isomorphic pressure, the absence of any coercive 
pressure from either them or other external forces such as the Government suggests social 
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It seems the practice of corporate responsibility or sustainability reporting1 is becoming 
mainstream practice, at least among some of the very largest corporations in the world. By 
2015, KMPG reported in its triennial survey that 92% of the largest global 250 companies 
were issuing such reports, a figure steady from 2013 (93%). They also reported that, on 
average, 73% of the largest 4500 organisations across 45 countries were undertaking such 
reporting (71% in 2013). Moreover, the average rate of reporting only dropped below 70% 
in the African and Middle East region, with the Americas, Europe and Asia-Pacific all greater.  
Yet, the same survey (KPMG, 2015) showed a dismal, if not entirely unexpected, result for 
New Zealand (NZ). It placed NZ 37th from 45 countries with a reporting rate of 47% (a similar 
position was seen in 2013 and 2011).2  
 
To put this in context, we need to understand that for a great many countries, not just 
regions, reporting rates in excess of 70% are now commonplace. Australia, for example, 
placed 23 from 34 in 2011 with reporting rates of 57%, but by 2015 it increased these to 
80% and placed 17th from the 45 countries. Finland, too, now has rates of reporting greater 
than 80% as does Spain. Yet, Australia, NZ and Finland all have an early history of pioneer 
companies producing voluntary supplementary disclosures on their social and 
environmental impacts and making these public either through standalone reports, or as 
supplementary information in the annual report. Countries like Portugal and Spain have 
come later to the party, but now have reporting rates greater than NZ. Not only has NZ 
failed to keep up with international reporting developments, it has been rapidly overtaken 
by a great many countries that have come later to the practice. Why, after a little over two 
decades of social and environmental reporting (SER) practice starting in NZ, has the practice 
                                                 
1 As the KPMG (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013) surveys have noted, various titles are provided for reported 
information that supplements an organisation’s conventional financial report. This information might appear 
in a separate stand-alone report, or be combined within a traditional annual report. Such information typically 
concerns an organisation’s social and environmental impacts, and while this type of reporting is most 
popularly referred to as “sustainability reporting” (KPMG, 2013), we concur with Gray & Milne (2002; 2004),  
Milne & Gray (2013) and Milne (2013) that the information provides no useful idea about the capacity of an 
organisation to contribute to a sustainable society, or planet. As such, we use the label ‘social and 
environmental reporting (SER)’ throughout this paper to refer to supplementary information on an 
organisation’s social and environmental impacts.   
2 NZ had placed 37th from 41 countries and 32nd from 34 countries in 2013 and 2011 respectively (see 




not spread and become commonplace among the very largest of NZ organisations as it has 
done in so many other countries?    
 
Considerable work on reporting has sought to articulate normative rationales for why 
organisations should report on their social and environmental impacts and externalities. 
First, an accountability perspective was built around a moral notion of a social contract and 
duty of care (see, Gray et al., 1988; Gray and Laughlin, 2012). Second, a business case or 
pragmatic perspective built around economic rationales of cost/benefit trade-offs is often 
articulated both by some academics (e.g., Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010) and professional 
business associations (e.g., WBCSD). The business case may be formulated as either or both 
a defensive strategy (e.g., legitimacy repair; risk and reputation management) or a proactive 
strategy (e.g., competitive differentiation and green/social marketing). Business case 
rationales are typically promoted by business-based organisations although they can often 
be dressed up as moral commitments to “doing the right thing”. Either way, neither case 
seems to have been particularly effective in NZ. 
 
Considerable research has also been undertaken to understand why organisations do 
report, especially when it remains a costly and often voluntary exercise. Much of this work 
from large cross-sectional reporting studies based on content analysis, reporting indices and 
firm characteristics (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho and Patten, 2008) often infers the 
strategic motives outlined above. More recently, there has also been work that has sought 
to interview managers responsible for the reporting practices of their organisations (e.g., 
Higgins et al., 2015a) and also a stream of case studies focused on understanding individual 
reporting organisations (e.g., Adams and McNicholas, 2007). Other work on smaller samples 
of reports using qualitative critical and narrative analyses has illustrated the potential 
political and ideological effects of such reporting (e.g., Tregidga and Milne, 2006; Laine, 
2009; Milne et al., 2009). And more recently there has been a stream of work on samples of 
reporters that has sought to understand the potential institutionalism of reporting practice 
(e.g., Barkemeyer et al., 2015; de Villiers et al., 2014). 
 
Much less well understood in the literature, however, is why organisations do not report, 
and especially so when operating in a climate of encouragement. While we have highlighted 
the fact that NZ is somewhat of an exception to the rapidly developing reporting in many 
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countries, it needs noting the spotlight is very much focused on each country’s largest 100 
such organisations. Beyond these 4000 or so organisations that KPMG survey, it would 
appear that a much greater proportion do not report (Milne and Gray, 2007; Martin and 
Hadley, 2008; Stubbs et al., 2013) or, to the extent they do, their ‘reporting’ is very much of 
a lower quality (Morhardt, 2010). Not reporting, in fact, is likely to be the norm.  Indeed, 
Stubbs et al. (2013) show, in Australia while 77% of the top 100 reported, effectively only 
17% of next largest 100 did so. Higgins et al. (2015a) also show that stand-alone 
sustainability reporting in Australia is likely limited to less than 130 organisations period. 
Stubbs et al. (2013) and Higgins et al. (2015b) go on to explore the rationales for why 23 
such Australian organisations do not report, and we draw on their insights below.      
 
We add to the non-reporting literature by focusing on the apparently failed role of business 
intermediaries specifically set up to promote sustainable business practices. Howells (2006) 
defines intermediaries as “an organization or body that acts as an agent or broker in any 
aspect of the innovation process between two or more parties” (p. 720). Internationally 
sustainable business intermediaries (SBIs) include organisations like the Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (BCSD, now the WBCSD), the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) and the World Industry Council for Environment (WICE) (Gray et al., 1996; Najam, 
1999; Schmidheiny, 1992).  Within NZ three main SBIs exist: The New Zealand Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (NZBCSD, est. 1999 under the WBCSD) and now 
named the Sustainable Business Council (SBC); Sustainable Business Network (SBN, est. 
2002); and Pure Advantage (PA, est. 2011). Our focus here concerns both the SBC and the 
SBN since while all three make claims about their interest in sustainability and sustainable 
development, the SBC and SBN are longer standing and focus most particularly on individual 
member business practices and reporting.  
 
While there are three widely cited motivations for business entities to ‘go green’ and/or 
publish SERs: competitive advantage and signalling, legitimacy and social responsibility (e.g., 
Bansal and Roth, 2000; Buhr et al., 2014), our concern here is less with the strategic motives 
of individual organisations and more with the institutional context in which they operate 
(Suchman, 1995; Higgins et al., 2015b). And while there is an emerging literature which 
supports the view that reporting has developed following institutional pressure (e.g., 
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Shabana et al., 2016; Barkemeyer et al., 2015; de Villiers et al., 2014), we seek to 
understand how you can be a member of a club, and yet resist that pressure and not follow 
its stated or implied rules of producing a report.      
 
There is limited research relating to the role of SBIs in fostering reporting.  Within NZ, 
research has involved interviewing and surveying SBI members (see Collins et al., 2007; 
2010; Robertson, 2012; Wright, 2011) but this work has not addressed the lack of reporting 
(Stubbs et al., 2013; Higgins et al., 2014b). Nor has research drawn from neo-institutional 
theory (NIT) to understand the role of SBIs over their members’ (lack of) reporting (Collins et 
al., 2007; 2010; Bebbington et al., 2009; Milne et al., 2009). Milne et al. (2009) do focus on 
the NZBCSD, but their study concerns the way the NZBCSD enabled and shaped the 
reporting content of eight early NZ reporters. Bebbington et al. (2009) also focus on early NZ 
reporters and the challenges they face developing their reporting. Both studies are relevant 
and discussed below, but neither directly tackles the role of SBIs.  Pursuing calls from 
academics, such as Parker (2005) and Owen (2008), this research involves engagement with 
field players, specifically NZ SBIs and a selection of SBI members, in order to understand 
their influence on SER and the resistance to practice. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews early reporting in NZ and 
consistent calls over its lack of development. The key tenets of NIT are then presented as is 
the use of NIT in a number of emergent reporting studies. The research approach is 
described and is followed by mapping the organisational field. The interview findings are 
analysed and the final section offers concluding comments.  
 
The Development of Social and Environmental Reporting in New Zealand  
Gilkison (1995-2003) provided early commentary on the state of SER in NZ. A judge on the 
NZ KPMG environmental reporting awards scheme, Gilkison provided an annual account of 
the state of play in the Institute of Chartered Accountants Journal (readership circa 30k). His 
article titles conveyed the sense of desperation at the lack of entries: Missing the green 
light; Award winners show the way – others need a push; Clean green companies? It’s hard 
to know if they won’t tell; Coming clean, sometime soon. Milne and Owen (1999) noted the 
awards scheme in five years had at best generated five serious contenders, but that fell to 
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two in 1999. The 1996 KMPG international survey had placed NZ last from 13 countries (see 
Appendix 1). And echoing the 2013 KPMG comments made earlier, Gilkison and Ensor 
(1999, p.x) suggested:  
 
…we have a voluntary reporting regime and (almost) no volunteers. At a time when other 
countries are moving ahead in leaps and bounds, New Zealand seems to be taking small steps 
backwards. 
 
Milne and Owen (1999) suggested being left behind was not inevitable. Leading reporters of 
the day, for example, Watercare Services, could cut it with the best in Europe, and a 
template based on leading European practice easily offered a framework for taking up 
feasible reporting practice. The following year an archetype standalone report was 
produced and the largest 200 NZ organisations surveyed to assess their reactions (Milne et 
al., 2001). Twenty-four (from 60) responded they did or intended to issue a standalone or 
supplementary information in the next three years, and Milne et al. (2001) were hopeful as 
many as 30 organisations might be reporting by 2003. Given the dire rates of reporting 
during the 1990s, things could only get better, and to some extent they did. They also asked 
why respondents thought companies did not report. The overwhelming response (60-70%) 
was a lack of stakeholder demand rather than cost, or a lack of adequate management 
systems.   
 
A critical catalyst to emerge on the scene during the 2000s was the two SBIs – the New 
Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development (NZBCSD) and the Sustainable 
Business Network (SBN). Both are member based associations, and both seek to promote 
sustainable business practices including reporting. The NZBCSD’s involvement in reporting 
was discussed in detail in Milne et al. (2009), but a core element of it was to take the leading 
reporters from its early membership as exemplars and use them as a base for a sustainable 
development reporting guide (NZBCSD, 2002). In addition, membership in the NZBCSD 
rested on a rule that members must produce a report within three years of joining.3 The 
NZBCSD built up its membership from an initial 24 organisations in 1999 to a maximum of 
74 in 2008, and these included some of the very largest organisations in the country. From 
2008 membership declined to a low in 2012 of 36 members when the NZBCSD merged with 
Business New Zealand to form the Sustainable Business Council (SBC).  The Council’s 
                                                 
3 This has now been amended to two years by the now Sustainable Business Council, discussed further below. 
8 
 
membership more recently appears to be on the increase with 42 members in 2013, and 73 
members listed on its website at January 2016 (see SBC, 2013a; Wright, 2011; Milne et al., 
2009).  
 
Certainly the NZBCSD breathed new life into a flagging and virtually non-existent SER 
practice, but it hardly set it alight. Through its membership it picked several pre-existing 
reporters, and offered them as examples to others, through a facilitated reporting guide.4 
Its stated aim with all its “projects” was for leaders and individual champions to spread 
practice among its own membership, and then for the membership to influence broader 
based (non-member) business practice (Milne et al., 2009). A significant part of the NZBCSD 
was to build a “business case” for all its projects. Reporting, its first project, was “sold” on 
the grounds of benefits to organisations – identifying stakeholder needs, risk identification, 
enhanced decision making, market opportunities, but also meeting transparency and 
accountability demands. A generic business case was also stressed with emphasis on 
internal and external drivers improving value (NZBCSD, 2002, pp 9-10).             
 
By contrast, the SBN focuses on typically much smaller SMEs and has a much larger 
membership of 400 plus members. The SBN, too, however, produced a reporting guideline 
of sorts in 2003 in conjunction with the Ministry for the Environment – Enterprise3 Your 
Business and the Triple Bottom Line (SBN, 2003). As with the NZBCSD guide, Enterprise3 
stressed a business rather than a moral case – reduced costs, risk management, reputation, 
and waste efficiency, for example. Emphasis was placed throughout the 36 page report on 
“sustainability in action” with examples from members. Three pages were devoted to 
reporting specifically although various other elements alluded to it.    
 
It is difficult to determine the exact pattern of SER development in NZ due to the absence of 
15 years KPMG survey data between 1996 and 2011 when NZ was not included in the survey 
due to a perceived lack of SER practices in the country.  It does however seem that any 
development has been relatively glacial in pace, and the NZBCSD has had limited effect. 
Some insights into reporting rates can be gleaned from a number of studies. Milne et al. 
                                                 
4 Landcare Research and URS facilitated the case studies of BP Oil, City Care, Hubbard Foods, Interface 
Agencies, Sanford, Telecom, Urgent Couriers, Watercare, and The Warehouse. The report was produced with 
funding from the Ministry for the Environment.  
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(2003) report on eight of the earliest stand-alone triple bottom line reporters in 2001 – all 
members of the NZBCSD. And, in a follow up study of NZBCSD members, Chapman and 
Milne (2004) report on 30 such 2002 reporters, but this study expanded the sample of 
reports to include discretionary disclosures in annual reports if a separate standalone report 
was not produced – only 11 were. Moreover, Chapman and Milne (2004) found only two 
reports scored more than 50% of the total SustainAbility/UNEP benchmark score, while 22 
reports scored less than 25% of the total score, indicating most ‘reports’ were cursory and 
of poor quality.  
 
In a study on the absence of independent verification in NZ, Robertson (2012) attempted to 
track down all known standalone reporters between 2001 and 2010. Focusing on Stock 
Exchange listed companies, and members of the NZBCSD, and including annual reports with 
at least four consecutive pages of social/environmental disclosure, Robertson found 
reporting and verification numbers as follows, which seem in line the 2011 KMPG reported 
rates: 
 
Table 1: New Zealand SER reporters and Verification statements 2001-2010 
 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Reporters 15 30 33 38 
Verification Statements 6 10 7 5 
 
Source: Robertson (2012, p. 43). 
 
One final study that sheds some light on SER development within the NZBCSD is Tregidga et 
al. (2014). This study followed a cohort of 2003 NZBCSD members (47), and included 
standalone and annual reports over the period 1992-2010, a period covering both before 
and after the NZBCSD formed in 1999. Tregidga et al. show about 10-12 NZBCSD members 
produced disclosures in 1999, from a known founding membership of 24, and several of 
these organisations were producing disclosures prior to joining the NZBCSD. By 2003, 
membership had grown to 47 members, and Tregidga et al. show reporting increased to 24 
members. It seems, then, that the NZBCSD may have grown reporters by growing its 
10 
 
membership base, rather than growing the rate of reporting within its membership, which 
remained at about 50%.5  
 
In short, whether we look at KPMG’s latest International Survey results of NZ’s N100 (2011, 
2013, 2015) or historic (and current) data on NZBCSD/SBC membership (some of which will 
surely overlap), it seems that at best about half report.  The statement from KPMG’s New 
Zealand Sector Report (2013, p. 2) therefore remains pertinent. 
 
There has not been a significant uptake in sustainability reporting in New Zealand since the last 
survey in 2011 and significant uptake is not expected in the near term. This is a discouraging 
outcome given the significant change in the [international] reporting landscape over that period. 
 
The days when sustainability or corporate responsibility reporting were considered an ‘optional 
but nice’ activity are past. It has now become a mainstream business practice worldwide. To 
date, however, New Zealand remains an exception to this rule and remains in the bottom 
quartile in terms of reporting uptake as identified in our global survey. 
 
Furthermore, based on Robertson (2012) and KPMG (2011, 2013), only about one fifth of 
these reports are independently verified.  These figures and observations lead to several 
conclusions. 
 
First, NZ was placed in the lowest decile in both the 2011 and 2013 surveys, and remains in 
the lowest 20% in 2015. Second, as the KPMG NZ supplement makes clear, while the 
reporting rates are quoted as 43% and 47% for the 2011 and 2013 surveys respectively, the 
more accurate rates for NZ-based local reporting (as opposed to international parent 
reports for NZ branches/subsidiaries) are 16% and 17% respectively. In other words, two 
thirds of the reporting rates cited for NZ, are made up of international parent reports. Third, 
NZ has a history of a lack of development of reporting dating back to the mid-1990s when 
environmental reporting awards schemes failed to provide sufficient encouragement, and 
which were widely publicized in reports by academics and professionals. In other words, the 
lack of reporting is something systemic that has been going on for a long time. Fourth, NZ 
also has a history of business intermediaries like the NZBCSD and SBN that promote and 
encourage SER which, despite building its organisational membership to a high of 74 
members in 2008 representing $NZ 59 billion and 43% of New Zealand’s GDP (Milne et al., 
                                                 
5 Consistent with the 50% ceiling of reporting from the 2011, 2013 and 2015 KPMG surveys, we have 
unpublished data that suggests the 2007/8 NZBCSD membership of 69 produced 33 reports (47%). The latest 
(January 2016) SBC membership of 73 suggests xxxxxx (xxx %) are reporting. 
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2009), have failed to grow SER practice or even enforce its own membership rule requiring 
SER by its members.  NZ’s lack of reporting has been ongoing for over two decades despite 
considerable efforts to promote and encourage it. At issue, is why have such organisations 
failed to report, and why have such local and international reporting encouragements failed 
to take effect?    
 
Institutional Theory and SER 
An institution is “more or less taken for granted repetitive social behaviour that is 
underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to 
social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 
5).  Broader influences include the social, political and economic issues that “define the 
organizational context” (Dillard et al., 2004, p.  511), having an impact on the organisational 
field and practices within an organisation.  The macro perspective of NIT is utilised to 
understand the creation, diffusion, adoption and adaptation of structures, over space and 
time, as well as understanding their decline and disuse, thus being outcome-oriented 
(Zucker, 1977; Scott, 2009). The micro perspective considers how an agent’s behaviour or 
action reinforces, maintains or alters structures, thus, it is process-oriented (Zucker and 
Darby, 2009). Seminal authors suggested the development and persistence of institutions 
from a combination of macro and micro levels are “inextricably linked” (Zucker, 1977, p. 85; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
 
The organisational field is defined as consisting of “a community of organizations that 
partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently 
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, 1995, p. 56). The 
primary focus of NIT is understanding interactions between and among actors within the 
organisational field and their influence on practices within organisations (Scott, 1991; 
Greenwood et al., 2008) or potential to resist institutions (Zucker 1977; 1987; Tolbert, 1985; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Dillard et al., 2004). Understanding power struggles within 
structures and organisations allows further understanding of the institutionalisation, or not, 
of practice within an organisational field (Dillard et al., 2004). Hence, Lawrence (2008) calls 
for work to investigate strategies of resistance employed by individuals and organisations 





A broader definition of the organisational field encompasses the pillars of isomorphism “a 
group of organisations that interact with one another and that are subject to the same 
regulative, normative and cognitive institutional constraints” (Palmer et al., 2008, p. 742). 
Through the pillars of isomorphism NIT offers explanations for change within organisations, 
from the perspectives of various actors within the field, or practices becoming 
institutionalised. The mechanisms and antecedents for isomorphism proposed by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) include coercive, normative and mimetic pressures.   
 
Coercive or regulative isomorphism considers how organisational practices are influenced, 
either formally or informally through an organisation that commands some form of power 
or through societal expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2009; Dillard et al., 
2004). Scott (2009) suggests that the regulative pillar comprises rules, laws or sanctions; 
practices are influenced coercively - the antecedent for this pillar is political influence.  
 
Normative isomorphism is often explained as external pressures associated with the 
antecedent of professionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, normative 
isomorphism can also be exercised through internal pressure (Zucker, 1987; Pfeffer, 1981). 
The rationale for the normative pillar is that certain practices are expected within or among 
organisations, such as shared social norms or values being adapted to, or acceding to 
societal and organisational rules, through a legitimate authority (Scott, 2004). Individuals 
also follow expectations about ‘doing the right thing’ (Higgins and Larrinaga, 2014). 
 
Mimetic isomorphism considers how one organisation may copy another organisation’s 
success hoping to attain a competitive advantage and/or legitimacy in an uncertain 
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose that 
organisations seek survival and legitimacy through adopting structures and practices from 
the institutional environment – mimicking practices of other organisations within the field – 
a strategic response (Oliver, 1991).  
 
NIT and SER  
A number of authors have used the organisational field as an approach to better understand 
the institutionalisation of practice. Kolk et al. (2008) found that according to the role of 
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dominant actors carbon disclosures were influenced, promoted or resisted.  Similarly, 
Brown et al. (2009) examined the GRI organisational field explaining that the founders 
(agents) affected the process of institutionalisation, reproducing power relations but not 
mobilising social action.  Higgins et al. (2015b) also took this approach suggesting that 
practices may diffuse as firms move into an organisational field but questioned whether a 
combination of isomorphic pressures was required to further SER.  Jennings and Zandbergen 
(1995) proposed that greater coercion, direct and indirect, results in greater likelihood that 
organisations adopt practices within a field. However, the authors noted with concern that 
coercive pressure can create a loss of normative values for influencing sustainability-related 
practices. Aerts et al. (2006) found mimetic pressure in an organisational field of highly 
concentrated industries was weakened through public media exposure. Furthermore, 
underlying coercive pressure may be evident through economic factors. Rahaman et al. 
(2004) provided evidence of how SER can be influenced within an organisational field – 
through the regulative pillar, with other (negative social) implications.  
 
Authors have also explained the institutionalisation of practice specifically drawing on 
isomorphic pressures and variously applying the concept of the organisational field. Kolk et 
al. (2008) explained how coercive pressure is an influence on the carbon reporting practices 
of business entities (see also, Cormier et al., 2004). However, the authors suggested 
pressure through institutional investors (stakeholders) to achieve global reporting coverage 
was weak and arguably needed regulatory backing (see Larrinaga et al., 2002). Buhr and 
Freedman (2001) and Cormier et al.’s (2004) research offered an understanding of how 
context influences SE disclosures and their convergence. Fortanier et al. (2011) find 
multinational companies adhere to global SER standards, coercive pull, with the role of 
domestic institutions diminishing. And other recent studies (e.g., Aerts et al., 2006; 
Barkemeyer et al., 2015; de Villiers and Alexander, 2014; Shabana et al., 2016) have used 
institutional theory to offer explanations for reporting patterns. Shabana et al. (2016) offer a 
perspective on US reporting patterns suggesting three periods of reporting from defensive 
to proactive to imitative, with each of the pressures of coercion, normative and mimetic 
dominating in each phase respectively. They suggest after an initial phase of the big, dirty 
and exposed reporters, others seeking competitive advantage joined the fray, and finally 
size and international standing of organisations ensured the practice became widely 
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diffused. None of these studies, however, attempt to map any organisational field of 
influencers, nor directly investigate their influence. Instead invoking industry or national 
level indicators in their statistical analyses or relying on indicators such as common 
professional qualifications, they typically assert explanations for commonality of practice 
(Higgins et al., 2015b; see also Gray et al., 2010). And nor do they explain why organisations 
subject to these same pressures resist and do not report.  
 
Few studies have utilised NIT at the organisational field level in order to explore the 
influence of key actors on the practice of SER. Collins et al.’s (2007; 2010) longitudinal 
studies document sustainability-related practices within SBN member and non-member 
entities in NZ, but they do not cover reporting. Based on a small sample, Bebbington et al. 
(2009) raised questions regarding the role and potential of SBIs, such as the NZBCSD, to 
pressure and encourage SER practice in NZ. However, a decade has passed since the 
reporting workshops and, as we have noted, SER trends in NZ have not improved despite 
that apparent influence. Indeed, at least one prominent organisation in Bebbington et al.’s 
sample has still yet to publicly report. 
 
More recently, Higgins et al. (2015b; see also Stubbs et al., 2013) have examined why a 
sample of large listed Australian organisations do not report. Drawing on institutional 
theory, and by mapping relationships, associations, and consequent material and discursive 
practices they argue a significant group of non-reporters are “unaware and oblivious” of SER 
because they are not connected within a “business and sustainability” issues-based field of 
influences and pressures. A second group of organisations, who were part of the issues-
based field, while undertaking numerous sustainable business related practices, also fail to 
report - largely it seems on account of a lack of stakeholder and institutional pressure. While 
reporting was ‘normal’ for this second group it was not inevitable: it was seen as a luxury 
not an obligation or necessity, and remains at the discretion of the organisation. Since it is 
not expected nor demanded, many of these organisations seemed to prioritise “actions over 
words.”  
 
In the case of NZ, as we have indicated, a substantial number of organisations are not only 
connected to, and have helped shape, a “business and sustainability” issues-based field (see 
Milne et al., 2009) as members of the NZBCSD/SBC, they have been obligated to produce 
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SERs within three (now two) years of membership.  Yet many do not. Moreover, the NZBCSD 
has been an active champion and promoter of SER since 2002. So why has it had such 
limited success? Consequently, we analyse the extent to which SBIs influence the SER 
practices of their members.  The following section outlines the research approach and is 
followed by our findings. 
 
Research Approach and Method 
 
Initially, we mapped the field through an analysis of journal articles, websites and news 
articles in order to understand the wider influences on member entities’ SER practices.6 This 
led to conducting semi-structured interviews with key field players in order to gain their 
perspectives on the current and potential role of SBIs influencing the practice of SER. We 
focus on two long standing NZ SBIs and 11 organisational members.  We include both 
longstanding reporters and others who do not report, or did so briefly or intermittently.  
 
New Zealand SBIs 
Three NZ SBIs, the SBC, SBN and Pure Advantage (PA), were identified as key players within 
the organisational field. These SBIs specific roles and interaction within the organisational 
field, publicly claimed interest in and potential to influence business entities’ action towards 
SER, determined their inclusion. These SBIs have voluntary membership, or affiliation-based 
membership, which suggests their members are interested in sustainability-related 
practices. We interviewed the CEOs of all three SBIs, however, since PA was a relatively new 
player, operates primarily at the macro policy level, and provides little pressure on 
                                                 
6 We acknowledge a much wider range of influences on SER than our focus on two SBIs in this paper. In 
mapping the field, we drew on academic work, websites, survey data (KPMG, 2008; 2011; World Bank Group, 
2003) as well as engagement with players in the field. Field players include: 12 international bodies, six 
national bodies, regulatory and standards setting bodies and three NZ SBIs. These bodies and individuals 
variously publicly promote sustainability-related practices through: involvement in SER awards, SER (best 
practice), benchmarking guidelines, regulatory roles, assurance/audit, policy input, and public exposure of 
related issues.  The 12 international bodies include: the GRI, ISO, WBCSD, AccountAbility, SIGMA, The Prince of 
Wales Charitable Foundation, SustainAbility, ACCA, CDP, and the IIRC. The Natural Step was included following 
two interviewees’ acknowledgement of their influence on the process of SER and KPMG was included as data 
from the KPMG triennial survey underpins the research questions. The six national bodies include the NZ 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA), Landcare Research, KPMG, Envirostate as well as academics and 
activists. Five regulatory or standard setting bodies, or organisations grouped by their role, were included as 
players within the organisational field. The NZ Government, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and the External Reporting Board (XRB). The four largest accounting firms are grouped as ‘The Big Four’ 
and include Ernst and Young, Deloitte, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The following non-accounting 
independent environmental assurers include: Tonkin and Taylor, URS, carboNZero and ERM New Zealand Ltd.  
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individual organisational behavior, especially the production of SERs, we report only on the 
SBC and SBN here.7  
 
The Sustainable Business Council (SBC) – previously the NZBCSD 
In 2012, the NZBCSD8 merged with BusinessNZ – Sustainable Business Forum (SBF)9 to 
become the SBC. Prior to the merger the NZBCSD membership had been steadily falling, 
declining from 75 to 55 between 2008 and 2010.  However, following the merger the SBC 
membership numbers increased from 42 in 2013 (SBC, 2013a), to 73 in 2016 (SBC, 2016). 
The SBC “promote sustainable business and policies” (Meadows, 2011) through the business 
case rationale (SBC, 2013b) and have produced a range of publications including seven 
earlier ones published by the NZBCSD. Some of the reports relate to measuring and 
reporting on GHG emissions and the Sustainable Development Reporting Guide, which was 
published in 2002 by the NZBCSD. The Vision 2050 report identified: important areas where 
SER is required, that  Integrated Reporting (IR) should be adopted by all of NZ’s largest 
companies and all listed companies should report on an established set of environmental 
and social factors, all by 2020 (SBC, 2012a).  
 
Membership criteria of the SBC included: producing a SER within two years of joining, a 
carbon intensity reduction plan within two years and a carbon footprint within one year. 
Since the merger, aspects of membership appear to have tightened with resignations invited 
if member commitments are not fulfilled. Perhaps highlighting the coercive pressure 
exerted, 19 SBC members’ SERs were displayed on the SBC website in 2012, 18 were dated 
2011 and one dated 2012 (SBC, 2012b)10. The list is not exhaustive but appears to include 
                                                 
7 Pure Advantage (PA) founded in 2011, and is running a ‘campaign’ to identify opportunities for sustainable 
economic growth while conserving NZ’s natural resources (PA, 2013a).  PA is funded by 11 trustees, high 
profile business people from the private sector, with 7,165 signatories. The vision of PA is to create a 
partnership among government business and social groups, driven by government strategy. The website 
displays case studies from 35 NZ business entities, some of which are members of the SBC and the SBN. All of 
these business entities are publicly affiliated with PA through case studies being displayed on PA website (PA, 
2013b). There is no membership or specified cost for involvement with PA. PA has focused on ‘robust 
economic research’, which has culminated in the release of two reports: New Zealand’s Position in the Green 
Race’ (PA, 2012a); Green Growth: Opportunities for New Zealand (PA, 2012b).  
8 The NZBCSD established in 1999 and initially comprised 15 founding business organisations in NZ with a 
commitment to ‘sustainable development’ (NZBCSD, 2012).   
9 The SBF was established in 2009 to “provide a business-centric platform for New Zealand companies wanting 
to define and lead sustainable business matters, rather than simply respond to government-led initiatives” 
(SBF, 2010). 
10 By 2016, a total of 16 SBC members’ SERs are displayed, one dated 2014 and 15 dated 2012 (SBC, 2016).  
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GRI rated SERs that are assessed through Landcare Research - CarboNZero; the official GRI 
data partner for the SBC. The SBC itself does not publish an externally available Annual 
Review. However, prior to the establishment of the SBC, the NZBCSD produced Annual 
Reviews (NZBCSD, 2002-2011). The content included financial disclosures in 2004 and 2005 
only.  In 2005, the SE disclosures were the most comprehensive and included GHG emissions 
data. Overall, the focus of the Annual Reviews appeared to be policy input (Milne et al., 
2006).  
 
The Sustainable Business Network (SBN). 
The SBN established in 2002 as a result of a merger of the Auckland Environmental Business 
Network (AEBN11), Business for Social Responsibility (BSR12) and Triple B.  The expressed 
rationale for the SBN is to help business become more sustainable and includes gaining 
external accreditation for sustainable business practices with a focus on transparency and 
accountability (SBN, 2013). The SBN has a large and diverse membership base (which has 
increased from 421 in 2013 to 473 members in 2016 (SBN, 2016). Members include public 
sector organisations, SMEs and large companies involved in various sectors (SBN, 2016). The 
SBN has no apparent membership criteria, is predominantly comprised of SMEs, operates as 
a professional network, is not pitched politically, and arguably is not as powerful within the 
organisational field as the SBC (SBN, 2013).  
 
The SBN has published a number of reports including ‘Enterprise Your Business and the 
Triple Bottom Line’. These were produced in conjunction with the Ministry for the 
Environment (MfE) focusing on SMEs business practices towards social and environmental 
change (SBN and MfE, 2003). The SBN produced Annual Reviews in 2006 and 2008 with a 
focus on awards and case studies. Government interest in sustainability was evident within 
the 2006 review but by 2008 with the election of the National Government it was not. The 
SBN ran networking events including the “Get Sustainable Challenge” in order to improve 
members’ sustainability focusing on practical achievements with a key role in promoting 
sustainability awards and minimal political-focus (SBN, 2013). 
                                                 
11 Rachel Brown, the current CEO of the SBN, established and led the AEBN. 
12 In 1998 the founder of Hubbard Foods Limited, Dick Hubbard, formed and Chaired the NZ business for Social 




Reporting and Non-reporting Participants 
Our second group of participants included senior executives from SBC and SBN member 
organisations. We initially tracked member organisation histories with the SBIs as well as 
their track records of publishing (or not) SERs.  We identified and approached 20 potential 
organisations. Eleven agreed to be interviewed and are identified in Table 2, along with their 
reporting and SBI membership histories.  The selection of these participants was important 
as they have roles either dedicated to, or encompassing, sustainability-related practices 
including SER.  
 
Table 2: SBI member organisations interviewed. 
Organisation SBI Membership External Reporting 
 NZBSCD SBC SBN Type Years Assurance (2012) 
       
3R Group13 2008   None - - 
Beca Group Ltd 2006   None - - 
Living Earth Ltd 1999   None - - 
Resene Paints Ltd 08-2010   None - - 
Waikato Management 
School 
2005   None - - 
Fonterra Cooperative 2002   Limited ARs None 
Hubbard Foods Ltd  99-2010   Limited 2001 & 2007 None 




Sanford Limited 1999   Consistent 2000-on KPMG/Limited 
The Warehouse Group 1999   Consistent 1999-on PWC/Limited 
Watercare Services Ltd14 1999   Consistent 1993-on ERM NZ/Limited 
 
The four consistent reporters were all founding members of the NZBCD and current 
members of the SBC.  Sanford, The Warehouse and Inzide15 were involved in the NZBCSD 
case study (NZBCSD, 2001).16  In 2001, Sanford and The Warehouse were deemed as having 
“begun the SDR process” (NZBCSD, 2001, p.3). In contrast, Inzide were new to external SER 
and deemed as having “no experience in the SDR process” (NZBCSD, 2001, p.3).  Watercare 
did not take part in the NZBCSD case study, but had been reporting since the early 1990s 
(Tregidga and Milne, 2006).  
                                                 
13 Since the completion of this research 3R has produced a report.  This report was for 2014/2015.  This report 
was not assured.   
14 See Tregidga and Milne (2006) which offers an interpretive textual analysis’ of Watercare’s sustainability 
practices from 1993 – 2003. 
15 Inzide Commercial is a NZ company separate from Interface Global. 
16 This case study was the basis for Bebbington et al.’s (2009) research regarding the SER practices of six 
NZBCSD member entities. 
19 
 
All of the non-reporters (and in this we include the two “limited” reporters) were, or have 
been, members of the NZBCSD. Hubbards and Living Earth were founding members. 
Hubbards was involved in the NZBCSD case study as a reporter with “no experience in the 
SDR process” (NZBCSD, 2001, p. 3) and this may have prompted them to produce a SER in 
2001. However, they did not produce another SER until 2007 and have not produced one 
since. Fonterra was a longstanding member of the NZBCSD, having joined in 2002. The 
Waikato Management School joined the NZBCSD in 2005 as an academic partner. Beca 
joined the NZBCSD in 2006 and complied with the membership criterion of annually 
producing a SER but never made this report public. 3R joined in 2008 with the Director of 3R 
having significant involvement in the NZBCSD (now the SBC) and the WBCSD. In contrast, 
Resene had a short-lived membership with the NZBCSD joining in 2008 and leaving after two 
years. Their initial connection related to a focus group on Product Stewardship.17 Similarly, 
Hubbard’s membership with the SBC lapsed in 2012 after the merger of the NZBCSD and the 
SBF. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
As well as secondary data,18 the lead author conducted semi-structured interviews with the 
13 participants (two SBI CEOs and 11 reporting/non-reporting senior executives). Semi-
structured interviews enabled the exploration of a range of potential influences on SER 
practice and examined the role of SBIs in particular. The interview questions were shaped 
from the SER literature, the theoretical framework, and relevant background information of 
field players. Interviews ranged from 45 to 75 minutes. Two broad themes were explored: 
 
• General influences on SER practices from three perspectives: SBIs; member 
organisations; and consistent reporters and non- reporters. 
• SBIs influence on SER from two perspectives; SBIs perceptions of influencing SBI 
members in contrast with SBI members’ perceptions of SBIs influence. 
 
Preliminary data analysis resulted in a categorisation of emerging themes and missing 
influences according to the interview questions and hence highlighted alternative 
interpretations (Hartley, 1994). Post interview analysis followed and encompassed data 
                                                 
17 Resene’s Product Stewardship program involves the recovery of unwanted/unused paint and paint 
packaging in NZ (Resene, 2013). 
18 Secondary data was collected through accessing publicly available information from SBIs and members’ 
websites and various publications including SERs, annual reviews, and media publications. 
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reduction, data display and data interpretation (O’Dwyer, 2004).  The process of revisiting 
the data on several occasions resulted in the lead author identifying issues and raising 
additional questions to further facilitate thematic coding of the findings and better 
understand field relationships and influences (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011). Each transcription was condensed from approximately 20 pages to two 
pages with themes highlighted by pertinent quotes. Revisiting the data was particularly 
important for this research with the interrelationships of multiple players within the 
organisational field.   
 
The emerging themes were described narratively, with participant responses offered as 
evidence, analysed through prior literature and explained through the theoretical lens 
(O’Dwyer, 2004). This approach offers the opportunity to understand how context impacted 
on these constructed understandings (Grbich, 2007).  The findings are the participants’ 
perspectives interpreted by the lead author, and discussed throughout the process with the 
other authors, seeking to analyse the influence of SBIs on the practice of SER in NZ.  The 
following section begins with an analysis of key players in the organisational field, 
presenting and discussing the findings. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
The Importance of SER  
Perhaps unsurprisingly all of our participants extolled the virtue of SER. They saw reporting 
as important for business entities to be accountable, and/or legitimate (Gray et al., 1996; 
Suchman, 1995), ‘the right thing to do’ (Pfeffer, 1981), a moral duty predominantly fostered 
through an internal champion (Buhr et al., 2014) and indicative of normative pressure 
(Higgins and Larrinaga, 2014). The business case rationale was evident with participants 
discussing the need for transparent and credible information (Buhr et al., 2014).  
 
It’s really important…it’s the transparency, it’s people knowing that when Sanford goes on the media 
or when Eric [CEO] is being interviewed by radio or TV he can be believed because we are not 
hiding…credibility is a biggie and it’s engagement (Sanford). 
 





It would appear that Fonterra’s focus was on business reputation (Bebbington et al., 2008) 
as well as maintaining a social license to operate (Buhr et al., 2014). Yet, participants from 
Hubbard’s and Resene raised concerns over the ambiguity of ‘who’ it is that needs to be 
convinced.   
 
The SBI representatives’ views varied regarding the importance of SER. For the SBC the issue 
appears to be credibility, both its own and its members, in order to demonstrate practice to 
stakeholders. 
 
How can you prove that you’re, you know, more exemplary in this area and we've got to be able to 
demonstrate that [through SER] (SBC)? 
 
The concept of legitimacy was evident (Suchman, 1995) and this rationale aligns with Buhr 
et al. (2014) who identify leadership and image as proactive facets for SER. However, the 
SBC is yet to produce its own SER and yet to enforce SER practice on all its members. 
 
The SBN representative suggested their focus is on facilitating members’ sustainability 
behavior through reducing unsustainable practices (Unerman et al., 2007). 
 
Reporting, you know reporting’s just a very limited function really in terms of change. It’s kind of a 
show off moment; it should be anyway cos often companies are doing [sustainability] (SBN). 
 
Doing the right thing (Pfeffer, 1981), consequently, was not necessarily seen to require 
reporting since it is unlikely to result in substantial change. As a result, the SBN did not 
consistently produce a SER or apply coercive pressure on their members to do so.  
 
The Role of SBIs  
The role of SBIs, as outlined on their respective websites, includes developing and 
facilitating members’ access to sustainability-related tools, networking through regular 
meetings, involvement in partnerships/projects and collective contribution to policy. This 
would suggest mimetic pressure is facilitated through interactions between and among 
members as found by Cormier et al. (2004) and around issues (see Hoffman, 1999). For 
example, the SBC representative claims: 
 
Mainstreaming sustainability into the New Zealand business sector...What they're wanting to do is to 




Member entities also perceived the role of SBIs as being sustainability focused through their 
networked structure. Concurring with Cormier et al. (2004), this structure facilitated 
mimetic pressure on sustainability-related practices through members’ involvement in 
initiatives and partnerships. Specifically, members of the SBC discussed having the ability to 
exchange, support and educate best business practice, or exemplar sustainable business 
practice but participant responses also highlighted the SBC’s focus on collective political 
(power):  
 
 [SBC] bring the voice of environment and business to influence government (Living Earth). 
 
Similarly, SBN members’ learn from each other through organised events such as seminars, 
workshops and awards, but with a focus on individual member’s sustainability-related 
practices.  
 
Our main focus was to be connected to an organisation that kind of had all this information flow 
coming in about you know sustainability, tips and tricks learning from other members, you know all of 
that kind of rich information coming in that we could then I guess you know learn from (Resene). 
 
Within the organisational field SBIs presented themselves as legitimate authorities and their 
collective membership supported that position (see, for example, Scott, 2004). In line with 
DiMaggio and Powell, (1983) and Scott’s (2009) proposition, this would suggest normative 
pressure through professional membership, and aligning with Greenwood et al. (2002), is 
important for legitimating change through the diffusion of practice. Furthermore, mimetic 
pressure is apparent through SBIs and member entities’ interactions with a range of field 
players (see Scott, 1995). For example:  
 
…international connections…our link to the WBCSD is really critical for that. Our project work it’s 
business to business…so we also broker it into the broader business (SBC). 
 
Yet, the interrelationships among field players did not appear to have broadened normative 
pressure or generated mimetic behaviour for SER leadership as hoped by Bebbington et al. 
(2009). Instead it would appear that the economic objectives of SBI members were 
reinforced (Tregidga et al., 2013). However, the initial findings do highlight significant 
potential of SBIs to facilitate isomorphic pressures on the SER practice of their members. 
This includes the potential of SBIs to influence policy (confirming Milne et al., 2009), 
although this appears to have waned under the current political regime and regulated or 
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mandatory reporting is not part of the SBC’s current or NZBCSD’s historical agenda (see 
NZBCSD Annual Reviews, 2002-2011). Neither is reporting policy the focus of the SBN. 
Rather the role of the SBN appears to confirm the findings of Stubbs et al. (2013) of a 
priority for ‘action not words’ and confirms Collins et al.’s (2010) findings - sustainability 
related practices are institutionalized, but this does not include reporting. 
 
Influences on SER: Member Perspectives 
Internal champions are discussed by members as having longstanding positions within the 
entities and influencing the initial decision to report. However, winning the day may take 
time.  
Internally we’ve been campaigning to make it publicly available for quite some time…I think in the 
future there is a potential for it to be publicly available (Beca). 
 
Members agree international players influence the process and content of reports but not 
the decision to start reporting. For example, the GRI and ISO, hold key positions in the 
organisational field allowing them to exercise, or facilitate through interactions, a range of 
isomorphic pressures on the process and content of members’ reports:  
But I use it [GRI] at the end more than at the [beginning]. I don't write a report to tick the boxes but 
some of the boxes they have on offer I think actually that’s a really good thing to report on. So it’s a 
tool yeah, but not, not the bible (Sanford). 
 
Although members raised issues of competing influences on reports, international players 
predominantly facilitated external normative and mimetic pressure, with potential through 
stakeholder pressure, to be coercively applied. For example, the influence of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) through normative pressure was apparent in the NZX50 listed 
members’ reports.  
What will be more of an influence is the CDP and the requirements for that because that is directly 
related to investors through the share market, which is our owners (The Warehouse). 
 
Legitimacy, image and reputation were dominant considerations among the consistent 
reporters. National level players were perceived as influencing the process and content of 
reports through involvement in awards, engagement in ‘best practice’ events, and 
interaction with other field players. Essentially, national players influence reporting 
normatively, through the business case and mimetically through interactions with other 





All consistent reporters engage an auditor and responses indicated this process has an 
important influence on the content, credibility and format of the reports. 
 
The fact that we're doing it [SE reporting], to them [stakeholders] says ‘oh okay’. And who's auditing it 
is the other thing. We always say third party verification is so important (Inzide).  
 
Similarly, stakeholder pressure was perceived as having an influence on the availability and 
content of reports specifically through external events.  
We need to change the way we do things. The three vessels in our Pacific Tuna fleet weren't ISO 14001 
certified they now are and just sort of reinforcing the compliance across the whole company (Sanford). 
 
Essentially, the business case rationale explains the influence of national, regulatory, and 
stakeholders on consistent reporters that focus on competitive advantage and respond to 
social pressures. These are proactively driven unless there is an external event. 
 
In contrast, non-reporters suggested audit and certification had a strong influence on 
sustainability-related practices, not reporting: notably the credibility of products (e.g. 
Resene). Furthermore, several non-reporters indicate there was significant influence from 
external stakeholders on current sustainability-related practices. 
We're in our infancy in terms of coming to [SE] reporting… pull’s coming from customers offshore, or 
retailers offshore, or the community offshore (Fonterra). 
 
Hence, coercive pressure, through regulatory players and stakeholders, was reactively 
driven through the business case and unless reporting becomes mandatory the role of these 
field players offers little likelihood of SER widely diffusing.  Indeed, Fonterra provided an 
interesting counter example. By size and internationalization it should be reporting 
(Shabana et al., 2016). It is NZ’s largest economic organisation with turnover >NZ$ 10 billion, 
and were it publicly listed it almost certainly would be reporting. Yet it is a farmer/producer 
co-operative. By the fact it is intimately connected within a sustainability issues-based field 
(Higgins et al., 2015b), and has been for over a decade, we might also expect it to be 
reporting. Yet, as Higgins et al. (2015b) point out, that is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for SER. In part, this is because the issues-based field has not made reporting a 






SBIs influence on SER: SBI Perspectives 
 
The SBC and SBN representatives both noted the membership criterion of the SBC has had a 
significant influence on some members’ decisions to produce external reports.  
 
When the Business Council [NZBCSD] had its mandate that all members must report within two years 
that drove it really quickly, that was really good (SBN). 
 
Yet the newly appointed Executive Director from the SBC acknowledged this membership 
criterion was not rigorously enforced in the past and indicated she would be enforcing this 
going forward and that the SBC will be producing its own report in the future. 
 
I walked into the job and talked to my board. I don't see how you can credibly ask someone say that 
you, as part of your membership you, need to do something and then have no idea whether people 
are doing it… I don't want this organisation to be seen as greenwash (SBC). 
 
It remains to be seen how effective the SBC will be at promoting change through intended 
and coerced reporting given its history to date.19  Yet, if coercive pressure can be widely 
applied to members, there is the potential for mimetic pressure to further diffuse reporting 
through interactions within and external to the organisational field. For example, the SBC’s 
umbrella organisation, BusinessNZ, offers further opportunities to extend this influence to 
business more broadly.   
 
Furthermore, the SBC promotes the GRI through their membership network. Three of the 
interviewed reporters apply the GRI G3 guidelines (current at the time) with their reports 
displayed on the SBC website, illustrating the potential for normative and mimetic pressures 
to influence reporting once it has commenced. The hint of further international influence 
was the development of IR. 
I think there's about to be another real shift in reporting. So when I was at the WBCSD meeting they 
were talking a lot about Integrated Reporting and the shift to that (SBC). 
 
Yet, we suspect IR in NZ, much like all previous forms of non-financial/SE reporting, is likely 
to remain just that, a hint. Neither the SBC nor the SBN executives believed that IR would be 
coercively pressured through government regulation – a seemingly necessary measure to 
get high levels of reporting penetration (KPMG, 2015), and one the NZ Government have 
                                                 
19 The SBC has still not produced a SER. 
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failed to take since the mid-1990s when Deborah Morris MP first proposed it (Milne et al., 
2001).  
 
And is the SBC any more likely to pressure its members to adopt IR than it has been with 
SER? It seems that while SBIs can certainly facilitate normative and mimetic pressures that 
shape SER, coercively applying pressure on voluntary members to initiate and maintain 
reporting is a more difficult task. In its early life, the NZBCSD seemed to promote itself as 
‘walking the talk’. Its previous chairman, Stephen Tindall, once famously quipped that if 
members did not participate in the NZBCSD’s projects, they would be “asked to leave – we 
believe in actions not words”. Ironically, a failure to act in the production of words in many 
cases does not seem to have been grounds for expulsion. Consistent with Higgins et al. 
(2015b), we observe that other activity – reducing waste, increasing resource efficiency, 
etc., - can legitimately substitute for a lack of reporting, and permit “conscious resistance”. 
Arguably member progress on non-reporting activity makes life difficult for SBIs to take 
delinquent (voluntary) members to task for a lack of reporting. Added to this, of course, is 
the need for the SBIs to maintain their own legitimacy in building and growing a successful 
voluntary movement, and for which member expulsion is counter-productive. In addition, as 
the SBC representative makes clear, until they themselves report calling on members to do 
so creates a cognitive bind.    
You needn't think that I’m going to require this of all of our members and I’m going to be based in an 
office where BusinessNZ doesn't have a sustainability strategy or a policy and we're not doing anything’ 
(SBC). 
 
SBIs influence on SER – Members’ perspectives 
The Warehouse, Sanford, Watercare and Inzide have all produced independently verified 
reports for well over a decade. Watercare was producing reports long before the 
NZBSCD/SBC existed (Tregidga and Milne, 2006), but joining the Council clearly impacted on 
the other three to report. With The Warehouse Chairman/founding CEO and Sanford CEO 
being key players in the formation of the NZBCSD (they were Chair and Vice Chair) this is 
perhaps not a surprise. Beca and 3R as more recent members of the NZBCSD/SBC also 
suggested their decision to initiate reporting was influenced by joining the SBC, although 
Beca’s report remains internal. Furthermore, the 3R participant suggested the SBC was 
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tightening up the reporting requirement, and claimed their first SER would be publicly 
available in 2013.20  
Because it’s a requirement for being a member we're stiffening that up as a Council and so we've 
certainly measured a lot of things and can report on them and we’re just finalising something now 
which will go to SBC which will then be published (3R). 
 
Other non-reporting participants were unaware of the apparent rule tightening, and so in an 
attempt to explore the potential impact of being exposed to stiffer isomorphic pressures, 
were asked how this might impact their reporting and/or member position. Beca and Living 
Earth suggested they were unlikely to leave the SBC due to the enforcement of the 
membership criterion and instead were likely to publish an external report. The participant 
from Fonterra claimed they were planning to report in 201321 but the pressure was from 
international ‘stakeholder pull’, not due to the SBC membership criterion. The Hubbards 
participant acknowledged the decision to produce two previous reports (2002 and 2007) 
was definitively linked to membership of the NZBCSD, although this requirement was not 
enforced. If it was, and they remained a member of the SBC, they also indicated their SER 
would recommence.  
If we were still a member [of the SBC] and we were told, “you really need to do this”, we would have 
done it (Hubbards). 
 
3R and Hubbards also highlighted the potential for SMEs to act as leaders and exemplars of 
best practice through report production, although it seems in the absence of the SBC 
enforcing its mandate to report, such potential was not sufficient to drive reporting.  The 
Beca participant identified the influence of the GRI facilitated through the SBC reflecting 
isomorphic pressures, but again, in the absence of any SBC mandate to report, it does not 
seem sufficient to drive the decision to engage in public reporting.  
In the last few years it has been GRI because we recognise that it is probably the most renowned 
sustainability reporting standard that there is and I would say that was probably the driver of our 
content more. But again that decision was made internally it wasn't driven by anyone specifically that I 
know of. I mean the SBC probably had a hand to play in that because I know that they hold that 
particular measure in high regard (Beca). 
 
Most of the non-reporting SBN member participants acknowledge the limited influence of 
the SBN on the decision to produce an external report. For most, the SBN was a facilitator 
                                                 
20 3R have subsequently released their first SER in 2014/2015 (3R, 2016). 
21 However, in February 2016 Fonterra is yet to publish a SER.  
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and a resource for sustainability practices, not a pressure for reporting. The Resene 
participant acknowledged that they were unlikely to produce an external report.   
…no we're just not that kind of company and Resenes just isn't it’s not a high focus and that probably 
comes from our GM (Resene) 
 
These findings confirm Bebbington et al.’s (2009) work that SBIs, specifically the 
NZBCSD/SBC, to date at least, have continued to exercise weak downwards pressure on 
their members’ reporting behaviours, and particularly the decision to initiate reporting. In 
the absence of a strong mandate for reporting either from external sources such as 
government regulation, or from a tougher approach to members, the diffusion of reporting 
remains at the discretion of the organisation. Where individual organisations see a business 
case for reporting, strong external stakeholder pressure, and/or where founder member or 
champion values overlaps with the softly-softly approach of SBIs, reporting is likely to occur. 
SBI membership alone, however, in the absence of strong firm level drivers, seems 
inadequate unless reporting rules are more strongly enforced. Clearly in some cases, firms 
do not seem to find a business case argument for reporting sufficiently persuasive, and 
consequently resist the weak coercive pressure of SBI membership. 
We're a member of the SBC which means that we have to produce the report and share it with them 
which we do and they encourage us every year to share it with the public and every year we say 
“thanks, but no thanks (Beca). 
 
Responses from non-reporters and SBI representatives also suggest barriers to reporting as: 
a lack of resources, ownership structure, and size of entities as well as competitors’ access 
to information. For some of the smaller non-reporters justifying the cost of reporting versus 
using those resources on ‘real’ initiatives was difficult. Privately owned organisations were 
also concerned about commercial sensitivity and giving away competitive advantage. And 
this too has the potential to reinforce a softly-softly approach on the part of the SBC.  
 
The resources to do that will, you know, take away from other work (Resene).  
 
People want a fair playing field. They want to know it’s across the board. So if you're my competitor 
we're both sharing the same cost (Living Earth). 
 
Furthermore, and in contrast with the views of SBI representatives, reporters and non- 
reporters alike identified a lack of NZ-based stakeholder demand for reporting, a point 
observed over a decade earlier by Milne et al. (2001), and raised in relation to numerous 




And we have not been compelled to do it [SE reporting] by any influencing force (Hubbards). 
 
Participants concur that government leadership is lacking and claimed they would support 
the regulation of SER. By leveling the playing field through legislation, some members would 
no longer be placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis those operating outside.  Yet NZ’s current 
(and indeed past) political climate has no appetite for reporting regulation. In the absence 
of a compelling business case, or a moral-based sense of accountability on the part of the 
organization, and likely its founding champions, it seems inevitable that the softly-softly 
approach is going to fail to lift the penetration rates of reporting in NZ.    
   
Concluding Comments  
We have sought to investigate and add insight into the historic and systemic dismal 
engagement by NZ organisations in SER.  Specifically, we have contributed to the non-
reporting literature by focusing on the apparent failed role of SBIs specifically set up to 
promote sustainable business practices – including SER.  Through engagement with field 
players, specifically NZ SBIs CEOs and a selection of SBI members (reporting and non-
reporting), we have gained insight into the influences on SER.  We have found that reporting 
rationales identified in the literature and promoted by the SBIs both motivate and cause 
resistance to reporting.  
 
Our findings demonstrate that reporting seems far from an inevitable outcome for 
organisations actively engaging with sustainability in NZ.  And while the SBIs appear to 
facilitate weak isomorphic pressure, the absence of any coercive pressure from either them 
or other external forces suggests SER seems set to remain a practice undertaken by the 
relative few.  Clearly to lend weight and import to SER the SBC needs to get its own house in 
order and begin reporting. It’s difficult to demand transparency of members and yet not 
provide it oneself. Even this, however, may be insufficient to compel all members to report. 
At heart, we detect that unless members clearly perceive some kind of economic advantage, 
or at least no economic disadvantage from reporting, they are unlikely to do so. In the 
absence of any strident stakeholder demand, compelling win-win logics for reporting remain 
far from clear. New Zealand’s SBIs seem to have been far more successful in emphasising 
and promoting other non-reporting ‘sustainable’ practices.  And perhaps this should be so – 
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actions not words. The difficulty of course is that in the absence of rigorous, independently 
verified accounts of such actions, it becomes difficult to judge how effective those actions 
are.  
 
While we would like to end on an optimistic note, perhaps suggesting new reporting 
horizons like IR or stakeholder and Government interest are rising, our analysis and 
engagement with this field does not lead us to such an outlook.  While there could be 
increased pressure from external forces (perhaps supply chain influences as we see within 
one of our organisations) these do not seem sufficient, nor widespread enough to create 
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Appendix 1: Trends in Reporting by Large Companies by Country 
 























Denmark 10 29 20 22 22/24 91 99 82 65 18  
France 4* 4 21 40 47/59 94 99 93 60 76 96 
Japan - 21* 72 80 88/93 99 98  23 28  
Malaysia - - - - - - 98 99 - 12  
South Africa - - 1 18 26/45 97 98 99 31 44  
Indonesia - - - - - - 95 99 - 6  
United Kingdom 27 32 49 71 84/91 100 91 90 56 57 61 
United States 44 30 36 32 73/74 83 86  13 23  
Canada 34 - 19 41 60/62 79 83  21 34  
Australia 5 15 14 23 37/45 57 82  51 43  
Nigeria - - - - - 68 82  14 17  
The Netherlands 31 25 26 29 60/63 82 82  41 45  
Finland 7 15 32 31 41/44 85 81  29 27  
Spain - - 11 25 59/63 88 81  65 57  
Singapore - - - - - 43 80  7 65  
Sweden 36 34 26 20 59/60 72 79  42 37  
Brazil - - - - 56/78 88 78  40 56  
Hungary  - - - - 25/26 70 78  33 44  
Columbia - - - - - - 77  - 45  
Italy - 2* 12 31 59/59 74 77  64 56  
China - - - - - 59 75 78 37 42 46 
Chile - - - - - 27 73  37 26  
India - - - - - 20 73 100 80 38  
Norway 26 31 30 15 25/37 - 73 86 - 29  
Portugal - - - - 49/52 69 71  45 55  
Belgium 27 16 11 9 - - 68  - 28  
Romania - - - - 23/23 54 68  23 35  
Germany 34 38 32 36 - 62 67  35 46  
Switzerland 19 - - - 28/39 64 67  27 40  
Russia - - - - - 58 57  13 33  
Slovakia - - - - - 63 57  28 9  
Mexico - - - - 17/17 66 56  25 34  
Poland - - - - - - 56  - 36  
Taiwan - - - - - 37 56  43 46 70 
Angola - - - - - - 50  - 32  
South Korea - - - - 42/42 48 49  75 88 86 
New Zealand 0 - - - - 27** 47  19 47  
Greece - - - - - 33 43  50 51 70 
Kazakhstan - - - - - - 25  - 20  
UAE - - - - - - 22  - 18  
Israel - - - - - 18 19  28 5  
Bulgaria - - - - - 54 -  20 -  
Czech Republic - - - - 14/14 - -  - -  
Ukraine - - - - - 53 -  19 -  
            
N 100 Countries  13 11 19 16 22 34 41 45    
Global 250 reports (%) - 35  45  52/65 79/83 95 93 92    
Global 250 assure (%) - 19 29 30 40 46 59 63    
N 100 report (avg %) 18  24  23  33/41 45/53 64 71 73    
N 100 assure (avg %) 15 18 27 33 39 38 38 42 24 38  
 
Adapted from KPMG (1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2015 – see also Buhr et al., 2014).  
*These rates were obtained from a later survey with comparative analysis. 
** This figure of 27% for 2011 was restated in 2013 to 43%. 
a These rates indicate the percentage of reports produced in 2011 or 2013 in each country from the N100 that were independently verified. 
For example, in 2011, in Japan, 99% of the N100 produced reports, and of these 99 reports, 23% were independently verified. In Canada, 
79 reports were produced among the N100, and of these, 21% were independently verified.  
b These rates are based on the online charts available at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/corporate-responsibility/pages/default.aspx  
